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A disproportionate share of low-skilled U.S. workers is employed by temporary help firms. 
These firms offer rapid entry into paid employment, but temporary help jobs are typically brief 
and it is unknown whether they foster longer-term employment. We draw upon an unusual, 
large-scale policy experiment in the state of Michigan to evaluate whether holding temporary 
help jobs facilitates labor market advancement for low-skilled workers. To identify these effects, 
we exploit the random assignment of welfare-to-work clients across numerous welfare service 
providers in a major metropolitan area. These providers feature substantially different placement 
rates at temporary help jobs but offer otherwise similar services. We find that moving welfare 
participants into temporary help jobs boosts their short-term earnings. But these gains are offset 
by lower earnings, less frequent employment, and potentially higher welfare recidivism over the 
next one to two years. In contrast, placements in direct-hire jobs raise participants’ earnings 
substantially and reduce recidivism both one and two years following placement. We conclude 
that encouraging low-skilled workers to take temporary help agency jobs is no more effective—
and possibly less effective—than providing no job placements at all.  
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A disproportionate share of minority and low-skilled U.S. workers is employed by 
temporary help firms. In 1999, African-American workers were overrepresented in temporary 
help agency jobs by 86 percent, Hispanics by 31 percent, and high school dropouts by 59 
percent; by contrast, college graduates were underrepresented by 47 percent (DiNatale 2002). 
Recent analyses of state administrative welfare data reveal that 15 to 40 percent of former 
welfare recipients who obtained employment in the years following the 1996 U.S. welfare 
reform took jobs in the temporary help sector.
1 These numbers are especially striking in light of 
the fact that the temporary help industry accounts for less than 3 percent of average U.S. daily 
employment.  
The concentration of low-skilled workers in the temporary help sector has catalyzed a 
research and policy debate about whether temporary help jobs foster labor market advancement. 
One hypothesis is that because temporary help firms face lower screening and termination costs 
than do conventional, direct-hire employers, they may choose to hire individuals who otherwise 
would have difficulty finding any employment (Katz and Krueger 1999; Autor and Houseman 
2002b; Autor 2003; Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003). If so, temporary help jobs may 
reduce the time workers spend in unproductive, potentially discouraging job search and facilitate 
rapid entry into employment. Moreover, temporary assignments may permit workers to develop 
human capital and labor market contacts that lead, directly or indirectly, to longer-term jobs. 
Indeed, a large and growing number of employers use temporary help assignments as a means to 
screen workers for direct-hire jobs (Abraham 1988; Autor 2001; Houseman 2001; Kalleberg, 
Reynolds, and Marsden 2003). 
                                                   
1 See Autor and Houseman (2002b) on Georgia and Washington state; Cancian et al. (1999) on Wisconsin; Heinrich, 
Mueser, and Troske (2005) on North Carolina and Missouri; and Pawasarat (1997) on Wisconsin.   2
In contrast to this view, numerous scholars and practitioners have argued that temporary 
help agencies provide little opportunity or incentive for workers to invest in human capital or 
develop productive job search networks and instead offer workers a series of unstable and 
primarily low-skilled jobs (Parker 1994; Pawasarat 1997; Jorgenson and Riemer 2000). In 
support of this hypothesis, Segal and Sullivan (1997) find that while mobility out of the 
temporary help sector is high, a disproportionate share of leavers enters unemployment or exits 
the labor force. If temporary help jobs exclusively substitute for spells of unemployment, these 
facts would be of little concern. But, to the degree that spells in temporary help employment 
crowd out productive direct-hire job search, they may inhibit longer-term labor advancement. 
Hence, the short-term gains accruing from nearer-term employment in temporary help jobs may 
be offset by employment instability and poor earnings growth. 
Distinguishing among these competing hypotheses is an empirical challenge. The 
fundamental problem is that there are economically large, but typically unmeasured, differences 
in skills and motivation of workers taking temporary help and direct-hire jobs, as we show 
below. Cognizant of these sample-selection problems, several recent studies, summarized below, 
attempt to identify the effects of temporary help employment on subsequent labor market 
outcomes among low-skill and low-income populations in the United States. In addition, a 
parallel European literature evaluates whether temporary help employment, as well as fixed-term 
contracts, provide a “stepping stone” into stable employment. Notably, these recent U.S. and 
European studies, without exception, find that temporary help jobs provide a viable port of entry 
into the labor market and lead to longer-term labor market advancement.
2  
                                                   
2 Given the diversity of labor market institutions in European economies, there is no presumption that the cross-country 
findings should be comparable. This makes it all the more striking that the thirteen (by our count) studies in this literature have 
developed such consistent results.    3
In addition to their findings, something these studies have in common is that they draw 
exclusively on observational data to ascertain causal relationships. That is, the research designs 
depend upon regression control, matching, selection-adjustment, and structural estimation 
techniques to account for the likely non-random selection of workers with different earnings 
capacities into different job types. The veracity of the findings therefore depends critically on the 
efficacy of these methods for drawing causal inferences from non-experimental data.  
In this study, we take an alternative approach to evaluating whether temporary help jobs 
improve labor market outcomes for low-skilled workers. We exploit a unique, multi-year policy 
experiment in a large Michigan metropolitan area in which welfare recipients participating in a 
return-to-work program (Work First) were, in effect, randomly assigned across a large number of 
service providers (contractors). As we demonstrate below, Work First participants randomly 
assigned to different contractors had significantly different placement rates into direct-hire or 
temporary help jobs but otherwise received similar services. We analyze this randomization 
using an “intention to treat” framework whereby randomization alters the probabilities that 
individuals are placed in different types of jobs (direct-hire, temporary help, non-employment) 
during their Work First spells.  
To assess the labor market consequences of these placements, we use administrative data 
from the Work First program linked with Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records for the 
entire State of Michigan for approximately 39,000 Work First spells initiated from 1999 to 2003. 
The Work First data include demographic information on Work First participants and detailed 
information on jobs found during the program. The UI wage records enable us to track earnings 
of all participants over time, as well as provide labor market histories on participants before   4
program entry. Among Work First participants who found employment, about 20 percent held 
temporary help jobs.   
Our primary finding is that “marginal” direct-hire Work First placements—those induced 
by the random assignment of participants to Work First contractors—increase payroll earnings 
by several thousand dollars, increase time employed by one to two quarters, and lower the 
probability of recidivism into the Work First program by 20 percentage points over the 
subsequent two years. These relationships are significant, consistent across randomization 
districts, and economically large. By contrast, we find that temporary help placements improve 
employment and earnings outcomes only in the very short-term. Over time horizons of one to 
two years, temporary help placements do not improve—and quite possibly worsen—these labor 
market outcomes. Rather than promoting transitions to direct-hire jobs, temporary help 
placements primarily displace employment and earnings from other (direct-hire) jobs.   
We also consider and present strong evidence against two potential threats to validity. 
One is that the adverse findings we document for temporary help job placements could be driven 
by a general association between “bad contractor” practices and use of temporary help 
placements. To address this concern, we first establish that the estimated negative consequences 
of temporary help placements are evident in almost all of the randomization districts in our 
sample, and hence that our findings are not driven by the poor practices of one or more aberrant 
contractors. Second, to explore the concern that there may be other important unmeasured 
contractor practices (e.g., additional supports and services) that explain the link between 
contractor random assignments and participants’ outcomes, we test and confirm that there is no 
remaining, significant variation in the effects of Work First contractors on participant outcomes 
that is not captured by contractor placement rates. Third, we find that direct-hire and temporary   5
agency job placement rates are positively and significantly correlated across contractors, a fact 
that reduces the plausibility of a scenario in which “bad” contractors primarily place participants 
in temp agency jobs and “good” contractors primarily place participants in direct-hire jobs. 
These findings suggest that it is job placement rates themselves—not other confounding 
factors—that account for our main findings. 
A second concern we tackle is the possibility of parameter instability. Because 
contractors have internal discretion about which clients to encourage toward which job types, our 
estimates might not necessarily identify a stable “intention to treat” relationship, as would occur 
if random assignments uniformly raised or lowered the probability that each participant obtained 
a given job placement (temporary help, direct-hire, non-employment). To address this issue, we 
exploit the panel structure of the data to analyze the labor market outcomes of participants who 
experience multiple Work First spells during the sample window and who are assigned to 
multiple contractors (because of  the repeated randomization). Fixed-effects instrumental 
variables models estimated on this subsample affirm the main findings: using only within-
person, over-time variation in outcomes for participants randomly assigned to contractors with 
differing placement practices, we estimate that direct-hire jobs induced by random assignments 
raise post-assignment earnings and employment, while temporary help placements retard them. 
Corroborating this evidence, we demonstrate that “marginal” workers placed in temporary help 
positions have comparable pre-placement earnings histories to marginal workers placed in direct-
hire positions, again indicating that the contrast between the positive labor market outcomes of 
direct-hire placements and the generally negative outcomes of temporary help placements result 
from differences in the quality of jobs, not from differences in the quality of workers placed in 
these jobs.    6
In addition to presenting findings from models based on the quasi-experiment, we use our 
detailed administrative data to estimate conventional OLS and fixed-effects models for the 
relationship between temporary help job-taking and subsequent labor market outcomes. 
Consistent with the U.S. and European literature above—but opposite to our main, quasi-
experimental estimates—OLS and fixed-effects estimates indicate that workers who take 
temporary help jobs fare almost as well as those taking direct-hire positions. The contrast with 
our core findings suggests either that non-experimental estimates are biased by the endemic self-
selection of workers into job types according to unmeasured skills and motivation, or that there 
are substantial differences between the “marginal” treatment effects recovered by our quasi-
experiment analysis and “average” treatment effects of temporary help placements observed in 
non-experimental data. We suggest that the emerging consensus of the U.S. and European 
literatures that temporary help jobs foster labor market advancement—based wholly on non-
experimental evaluation—should be carefully considered in light of the evidence from random 
assignments.
3  
1.  Prior evidence and the Michigan Work First quasi-experiment 
 
a.  Prior non-experimental estimates 
The characteristics of workers who take direct-hire and temporary help jobs differ 
significantly. Even in our relatively homogenous sample, we find that Work First participants 
who take temporary help jobs are older, more likely to be black, and have higher prior earnings 
in the temporary help sector than do participants who take direct-hire jobs (see Table 1). Not 
surprisingly, the contrast with those who take no employment during their Work First spell is 
                                                   
3 Our microeconomic evidence answers the question of whether temporary help jobs benefit the individuals who take 
them, but it does not inform the question of whether the activities of temporary help firms and other flexible labor market 
institutions (such as fixed-term contracts) improve or retard aggregate labor market performance by reducing search frictions or 
improving the quality of worker-firm matches. See Katz and Krueger (1999), Blanchard and Landier (2002), García-Pérez and 
Muñoz-Bullón (2002), and Neugart and Storrie (2002, 2005).   7
much more pronounced. These contrasts underscore the difficulty of disentangling the effects of 
job-taking on subsequent labor market outcomes from the causes that determine what jobs are 
taken initially.  
Several recent studies attempt to overcome problems of sample selection. Lane et al. 
(2003) use matched propensity score techniques to study the effects of temporary agency 
employment on the labor market outcomes of low-income workers and those at risk of being on 
welfare. They cautiously conclude that temporary employment improves labor market outcomes 
among those who might otherwise have been unemployed, and they suggest the use of temporary 
help jobs by welfare agencies as a means to improve labor market outcomes. However, they 
acknowledge that in their Survey of Income and Program Participation data it was infeasible to 
construct comparison groups that were well-matched on earnings histories but differed on job 
types, which led to a potential bias in the estimates.  
Using a research population and database closely comparable to the one used in this 
study, Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005) study the effects of temporary agency employment 
on subsequent earnings among welfare recipients in two states. To control for possible selection 
bias in the decision to take a temporary agency job, they estimate a selection model that is 
identified through the exclusion of various county-specific measures from the models for 
earnings but not from those for employment. Interestingly, the correction for selection bias has 
little effect on their regression estimates, suggesting either that the selection problem is 
unimportant or that their instruments do not adequately control for selection on unobservable 
variables.
4 Like Lane et al. (2003), they find that the initial earnings of those taking temporary 
help jobs are lower than of those taking direct-hire jobs but that they are significantly better than 
                                                   
4 Their empirical strategy assumes that the county-level variables used to identify the selection model influence 
earnings only through their impact on employment and job type, an assumption they acknowledge is likely violated.     8
of those who are not employed and tend to converge over two years toward the earnings of those 
initially taking direct-hire jobs.  
An alternative approach, pursued by Ferber and Waldfogel (1998) and Corcoran and 
Chen (2004), is to estimate fixed-effects regressions to assess whether individuals who move into 
temporary help and other non-traditional jobs generally experience improvements in labor-
market outcomes. A virtue of the fixed-effect model is that it will purge time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity in individual earnings levels that might otherwise be a source of bias.
 
However, if there is heterogeneity in earnings trajectories (rather than in earnings levels) that is 
correlated with job-taking behavior, the fixed-effects model will not resolve this bias.
5 As is 
consistent with other work, the studies by Ferber and Waldfogel (1998) and Corcoran and Chen 
(2005) find that temporary help and other non-standard work arrangements are associated with 
improvements in individuals’ earnings and employment.  
Numerous recent studies have addressed the role of temporary employment in facilitating 
labor market transitions in Europe. Using propensity score matching methods, Ichino et al. 
(2004, 2005) conclude that, relative to starting off unemployed, being in a temporary help job 
significantly increases the probability of finding permanent employment within 18 months. In a 
similar vein, Gerfin et al. (forthcoming) use matching techniques to estimate the effect of 
subsidized temporary help placements on the labor market prospects of unemployed workers in 
Switzerland and find significant benefits to these placements. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 
(2002) and García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2002) study the effects on subsequent employment 
outcomes of temporary (agency and fixed-term) employment in Britain and temporary agency 
                                                   
5 The fixed-effects estimator is ideally suited to a problem where successive outcome observations for each individual 
reflect simple deviations from a stable mean, i.e., a fixed, additive error component. But many low-skilled workers, and 
especially those receiving welfare, are likely to be undergoing significant shifts in labor force trajectory as they transition from 
non-employment to employment. This heterogeneity in slopes rather than intercepts will not be resolved by the fixed-effects   9
employment in Spain, respectively. Their empirical strategies are similar to those used in 
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005), and they find generally positive effects of temporary 
employment, as well. Using matching and regression control techniques, studies by Andersson 
and Wadensjö (2004), Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo, and Muñoz-Bullón (2005), and Kvasnicka 
(2005) also find positive effects of temporary help employment on labor market advancement for 
workers in Sweden, Spain, and Germany, respectively. Zijl et al. (2004) apply a structural 
duration model to estimate the effect of temporary help job-taking on durations to direct-hire 
(“regular”) work in the Netherlands and conclude that temporary help jobs substantially reduce 
unemployment durations and increase subsequent job stability.  
While all of these non-experimental studies conclude that temporary help jobs improve 
subsequent labor market outcomes, we believe that the importance of the research question also 
warrants an experimental (or quasi-experimental) evaluation to explore the robustness of these 
conclusions. We pursue such an approach here.
6 
b.  Our Approach: The Michigan Work First quasi-experiment 
Most recipients of TANF (‘Temporary Assistance for Needy Families’) benefits must 
fulfill mandatory minimum work requirements. In Michigan, those applying for TANF benefits 
who do not meet these work requirements must begin participating in a Work First program 
designed to help place them in employment. For administrative purposes, welfare and Work First 
services in the metropolitan area we study are divided into geographic districts, which we refer to 
as randomization districts. The Work First program is administered by a city agency, but the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
model. In Section 3, we assess whether fixed-effects models resolve the biases stemming from self-selection and conclude that 
they do not.  
6 The approach taken in this paper follows our earlier pilot study (Autor and Houseman 2002a), which exploits a 
smaller quasi-experimental randomization of Work First participants in another metropolitan area of Michigan and analyzes only 
short-term labor market outcome measures. (Unemployment Insurance wage records were not available for that study.) The 
earlier study and the current work both find positive short-term effects of temporary help placements on earnings. By utilizing UI 
records to analyze long-term outcomes, the current study demonstrates that these short-term benefits wash out rapidly.   10
actual provision of services is contracted out to non-profit or public organizations. Within each 
geographic district, one to three Work First contractors provide services for TANF recipients 
residing in the district in each program year. When multiple contractors provide Work First 
services within a district, they alternate taking in new participants. Thus, the contractor to which 
a participant is assigned depends on the date that he or she applied for benefits. As we 
demonstrate formally below, this intake procedure is functionally equivalent to random 
assignment.
7 
As the name implies, the Work First program focuses on placing participants into jobs 
quickly. All contractors operating in our metropolitan area offer a fairly standardized one-week 
orientation that teaches participants basic job-search and life skills. Services such as childcare 
and transportation are provided by outside agencies and are available on an equal basis to 
participants at all contractors.  
By the second week of the program, participants are expected to search intensively for 
employment and are formally required to take any job offered to them provided it pays the 
federal minimum wage and satisfies work hours requirements. Although Work First participants 
may find jobs on their own, job developers at each contractor play an integral role in the 
process.
8 This role includes encouraging and discouraging participants from applying for specific 
jobs and to specific employers, referring participants directly to job sites for specific openings, 
and arranging on-site visits by employers—including temporary help agencies—that screen and 
recruit participants at the Work First office. For example, Autor and Houseman (2005, Table 1) 
report that 24 percent of contractors surveyed in this metropolitan area refer participants to 
                                                   
7 Participants reentering the system for additional Work First spells follow the same assignment procedure and thus 
may be reassigned to another contractor. 
8 In a survey of contractors operating in this city, half indicated they were directly involved in 75 percent or more of 
Work First participant job placements, and 85 percent of contractors took credit for more than 50 percent of the jobs obtained in 
their program (Autor and Houseman 2005).    11
temporary help jobs on a weekly basis, while 38 percent make such referrals only sporadically or 
never. Similarly, 14 percent of contractors directly invite temporary help agencies on-site weekly 
or monthly to recruit participants, while 29 percent of contractors never do so.
  The correlations 
between these frequencies and contractors’ (self-reported) temporary agency placement rates are 
0.29 for on-site visits and 0.53 for temporary agency referrals, the latter of which is highly 
significant. This indicates that the jobs that participants take depend in part on contractors’ 
employer contacts and, more generally, on policies that foster or discourage temporary agency 
employment among participants. 
It is logical to ask why contractors’ placement practices significantly vary. The most 
plausible answer is that contractors are uncertain about which types of job placements are most 
effective and hence pursue different policies. Contractors do not have access to UI wage records 
data (used in this study to assess participants’ labor market outcomes), and they collect follow-up 
data only for a short time period and only for individuals placed in jobs. Hence, they cannot 
rigorously assess whether job placements improve participant outcomes or whether specific job 
placement types matter. During in-person and phone interviews conducted for this study, 
contractors expressed considerable uncertainty, and differing opinions, about the long-term 
consequences of temporary job placements (Autor and Houseman 2005).  
We exploit these differences, which impact the probability of temporary agency, direct-
hire, or non-employment among statistically identical populations, to identify the effects of Work 
First employment and job type on long-term earnings and program recidivism. In our 
econometric specification, we use contractor assignment as an instrumental variable affecting the 
probability that a participant obtains a temporary help job, a direct-hire job, or no job during the 
program.    12
Our methodology does not assume that contractors have no effect on participant 
outcomes other than through their effects on job placements—only that any other practices 
affecting participant outcomes are uncorrelated with contractor placement rates. However, few 
resources are spent on anything but job development (Autor and Houseman 2005). General or 
life skills training provided in the first week of the Work First program is very similar across 
contractors. And support services intended to aid job retention, such as childcare and 
transportation, are equally available to participants in all contractors and are provided outside the 
program. Survey evidence collected for the majority of contractors in our sample confirms that 
Work First services other than job placements are almost entirely standardized across contractors 
operating in this metropolitan area (Autor and Houseman 2005). In Section 4, we provide 
econometric evidence supporting the validity of the identification assumption. 
2.  Testing the research design 
a.  Data and sample 
Our research data are comprised of Work First administrative records data linked to 
quarterly earnings from the State of Michigan’s unemployment insurance wage records data 
base. We use administrative data on all Work First spells initiated from the fourth quarter of 
1999 through the first quarter of 2003 in the metropolitan area. The administrative data contain 
detailed information on jobs obtained by participants while in the Work First program. To 
classify jobs into direct-hire and temporary help, we use the names of employers at which 
participants obtained jobs in conjunction with carefully compiled lists of temporary help 
agencies in the metropolitan area.
9 In a small number of cases where the appropriate coding of an 
employer was unclear, we collected additional information on the nature of the business through 
                                                   
9 Particularly helpful was a comprehensive list of temporary agencies operating in our metropolitan area as of 2000, 
developed by David Fasenfest and Heidi Gottfried.    13
an internet search or telephone contact. We also use the administrative data to calculate the 
implied weekly earnings for each Work First job by multiplying the hourly wage rate by weekly 
hours.  
The UI data include total earnings in the quarter and the industry in which the individual 
had the most earnings in the quarter. We use them to construct pre- and post- Work First UI 
earnings for each participant for the four to eight quarters prior to and subsequent to the Work 
First placement.
10  
In 14 of the districts in the metropolitan area, two or more Work First contractors served 
the district over the time period studied. In two districts, however, one contractor in each district 
was designated to serve primarily ethnic populations, and participants were allowed to choose 
contractors based on language needs. We drop these two districts from our sample. We further 
limit the sample to spells initiated when participants were between the ages of 16 and 64 and 
drop spells where reported pre- or post-assignment quarterly UI earnings values exceed $15,000 
in a single calendar quarter. These restrictions reduce the sample by less than 1 percent. Finally, 
we drop all spells initiated in a calendar quarter in any district where one or more participating 
contractors received no clients during the quarter, as occasionally occurred when contractors 
were terminated and replaced.
11  
Table 1 summarizes the means of variables on demographics, work history, and earnings 
following program entry for all Work First participants in our primary sample as well as by 
program outcome: direct-hire job, temporary help job, or no job. The sample is predominantly 
female (94 percent) and black (97 percent). Slightly under half (47 percent) of Work First spells 
resulted in job placements. Among spells resulting in jobs, 20 percent have at least one job with 
                                                   
10 The UI wage records exclude earnings of federal and state employees and of the self-employed.   14
a temporary agency. The average earnings and total quarters of employment over the four 
quarters following program entry are comparable for those obtaining temporary agency and 
direct-hire jobs, while earnings and quarters of employment for those who do not obtain 
employment during the Work First spell are 40 to 50 percent lower.
12  
The average characteristics of participants vary considerably according to job outcome. 
Those who do not find jobs while in Work First are more likely to have dropped out of high 
school, to have worked fewer quarters before entering the program, and to have lower prior 
earnings than those who find jobs. Among those placed in jobs, those taking temporary agency 
jobs actually have somewhat higher average prior earnings and quarters worked than those 
taking direct-hire jobs. Not surprisingly, those who take temporary jobs while in the Work First 
program have higher prior earnings and more quarters worked in the temporary help sector than 
those who take direct-hire jobs. Data used in previous studies show that blacks are much more 
likely than whites to work in temporary agency jobs (Autor and Houseman 2002b; Heinrich, 
Mueser, and Troske 2005). Even in our predominantly African-American sample, we also find 
this relationship.  
The table reveals one further noteworthy pattern: hourly wages, weekly hours, and 
weekly earnings are uniformly higher for participants in temporary help jobs than for those in 
direct-hire jobs. This pattern stands in contrast to the widely reported finding of lower wages in 
temporary help positions (Segal and Sullivan 1998; General Accounting Office 2000; DiNatale 
2001).  Although it is possible that this pattern is specific to the regional labor market we study, 
many studies that report lower earnings for temporary help agency jobs, including Segal and 
Sullivan (1998), rely on quarterly unemployment insurance records which report total earnings 
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 This further reduced the final sample by 3,091 spells, or 7.4 percent. We have estimated the main models including 
these observations with near-identical results.   15
but not hours of work. Because temporary help jobs are generally transitory, the absence of hours 
information in UI data may lead to the inference that temporary help jobs pay lower hourly 
wages when in fact they simply provide fewer total hours.  
b.  Testing the efficacy of the random assignment 
If Work First assignments are functionally equivalent to random assignment, observed 
characteristics of clients assigned to contractors within a randomization district should be 
statistically indistinguishable. We test the random assignment across contractors within 
randomization district for each program year by comparing the following ten participant 
characteristics : gender, white race, other (non-white) race, age, elementary-school-only 
education, post-elementary high-school drop-out education, number of quarters worked in the 
eight quarters before program entry, number of quarters primarily employed with a temporary 
agency in these prior eight quarters, total earnings in these prior eight quarters, and total earnings 
in the prior eight quarters from quarters where a temporary agency was the primary employer.  
With ten participant characteristics, we are likely to obtain many false rejections of the 
null (i.e., Type I errors), and this is exacerbated by the fact that not all participant characteristics 
are independent (e.g., less educated participants are more likely to be minorities). To resolve 
these confounding factors, we use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) system to estimate 
the probability that the observed distribution of participant covariates across contractors within 
each randomization district and year is consistent with chance.
13 The SUR accounts for both the 
multiple comparisons (ten) simultaneously in each district and the correlations among 
demographic characteristics across participants at each contractor.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Note that because participants who do not find jobs during their Work First assignments face possible sanctions, 
unsuccessful participants continue to face strong work incentives after leaving Work First. 
13 This method for testing randomization across multiple outcomes is proposed by Kling et al. (2004) and Kling and 
Liebman (2004).   16
Formally, let 
k
idt X  be a  1 k ×  vector of covariates containing individual characteristics for 
participant i assigned to one contractor in district d  during year t. Let  idt Z  be a vector of 
indicator variables designating the contractor assignment for participant i, where the number of 
columns in Z  is equal to the number of contractors in district d . Let  k I  be a k  by k  identity 
matrix. We estimate the following SUR model: 
(1) 
1 (( 1 ) ) ( , . . . , )
k
dt k dt dt dt dt XIZ XX X θψ ′ ′ ′ =⊗ + = . 
Here,  dt X  is a stacked set of the participant covariates, the set of control variables include 
contractor assignment dummies and a constant, and ψ  is a matrix of error terms that allows for 
cross-equation correlations among participant characteristics within district-contractor cells.
14 
The p-value for the joint significance of the elements of Z  in this regression system provides an 
omnibus test for the null hypothesis that participant covariates do not differ among participants 
assigned to different contractors within a district and year; a high p-value corresponds to an 
acceptance of this null.  
Table 2 provides the chi-square statistics and p-values for the significance of Z  in 
estimates of Equation (1) for each of the 41 district-by-year cells in our sample.
15 Consistent with 
the hypothesis that assignment of participants across contractors operating within each district is 
functionally equivalent to random assignment, we find that 46 of 48 comparisons accept the null 
hypothesis at the 10 percent level and 47 of 48 at the 5 percent level. We next perform grouped 
statistical tests to evaluate the validity of the randomization for the entire experiment. Since 
participant assignments are independent across districts and over time, the chi-square test 
                                                   
14 Since the contractor assignment dummies in  Z  are mutually exclusive, one is dropped. 
15 Seven of 48 district-by-year cells are dropped because there is only one (or in some cases no) participating contractor 
in the district for most or all of the year. In two district-by-year cells, one matching characteristics (race or education) was 
identical for all randomly-assigned participants; we therefore did not test for equality of this characteristic within the cell, and the 
degrees of freedom for the chi-square statistic are reduced accordingly.   17
statistics in each cell can be combined to form an overall chi-squared test statistic (DeGroot and 
Schervish 2002, Theorem 7.2.1). As is shown in the final row and column of Table 2, the overall 
p-value of the randomization across all 41 cells in our samples is 0.33, with 587 degrees of 
freedom. Moreover, the null of participant balance across contractors within districts is accepted 
at the 5 percent level or better in each of the 12 districts and in all four years of the sample. In 
sum, the data appear to affirm the efficacy of the random assignment. 
c.  The effect of contractor assignments on job placements 
Our research design also requires that contractor random assignments significantly affect 
participant job placement outcomes. To test whether this occurs, we estimated a set of SUR 
models akin to equation (1) where the dependent variables are participant Work First job 
outcomes (direct-hire, temporary help, non-employment). These tests provide strong support for 
the efficacy of the research design: all tests of contractor-assignment effects on participant job 
placements—either across contractors within a year or within contractors across years—reject 
the null at the 1 percent level or better. The omnibus test for all 41 comparisons also rejects the 
null at well below the 1 percent level.
16  
Are the effects of randomization on participant job placement outcomes economically 
large in addition to being statistically significant? To answer this question, we calculate partial 
R-squared values from a set of regressions of each job placement outcome on the random 
assignment dummy variables. These partial-R-squared values are 0.019 for any employment, 
0.013 for temporary help employment, and 0.011 for direct-hire employment. We benchmark 
these values against the partial R-squared values from a set of regressions of the three job 
placement outcomes on all other pre-determined covariates in our estimates including the ten   18
demographic and earnings history variables discussed above and a complete set of district-by-
year and calendar-year-by-quarter of assignment dummies. The partial-R-squared values for 
these pre-determined covariates are 0.036 for any employment, 0.024 for temporary help 
employment, and 0.026 for direct-hire employment. A comparison of the two sets of partial R-
squared values shows that the random assignments explain 40 to 55 percent as much of the 
variation in job placement outcomes among participants as do the combined effects of 
demographics, earnings history, and district and time effects. We conclude that the economic 
magnitude of the randomization on job-taking outcomes is substantial. 
3.  Main results: The effects of job placements on earnings and employment 
 
We now use the linked quarterly earnings records from the state of Michigan’s 
unemployment insurance system to assess how Work First job placements affect participants’ 
earnings and employment over the subsequent eight calendar quarters following random 
assignment.
17 Our primary empirical model is: 
(2)  12 3 () icdt i i i d t d t icdt YT D X α β β β γθγ θε ′ =+ + + + ++ × + , 
where the dependent variable is real UI earnings or quarters of UI employment following the 
quarter of Work First assignment. Subscript i  refers to participants, d  to randomization districts, 
c  to contractors within randomization districts, and t to assignment years. The variables  i D  and 
i T  are indicators equal to one if participant i  obtained a direct-hire or temporary-agency job 
during the Work First spell. The vector of covariates,  X , includes gender, race (white, black, or 
other), age, education (primary school only, high school dropout, high school graduate, greater 
than high school), and UI earnings (in real dollars) for the 4 quarters prior to random assignment. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
16 Tables displaying these results are available from the authors. At the district-by-year level, we reject the null 
hypothesis of no contractor effects on job placement outcomes in 36 of 41 district-year cells at the 1 percent level, and we reject 
at the 5 percent level in 39 of 41 cells.    19
The vectors γ  and θ  contain dummies for randomization districts and year by quarter of random 
assignment.  
The coefficients of interest in this model are  1 β  and  2 β , which provide the conditional 
mean difference in hours and earnings for participants who obtained direct-hire or temporary-
agency jobs during their Work First spells relative to participants who did not obtain any 
employment. The estimation sample includes 38,689 participant spells initiated between 1999 
and 2003 in the 12 randomization districts in our sample. To account for the grouping of 
participants within contractors, we use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the 
contractor × year of assignment level.
18  
In subsequent two-stage least squares models (2SLS), we instrument T  and D with 
contractor-assignment-by-year dummy variables. For purposes of the 2SLS models, use of these 
contractor-by-year dummy variables is almost identical to using contractor-year placement job 
rates (by job type) as instrumental variables.
19 Accordingly, this model can be conveniently 
approximated as  
(3)    
12 ()
TD
ct ct icdt i d t d t ct icdt YP P X α ππ β γ θ γ θ ν ω =+ + + + ++ × + + , 
where   
T
ct P  and   
D
ct P  are contractor × year temporary help and direct-hire placement rates, and 
where the error term is partitioned into two additive components,  icdt ct icdt e ν ω = + . The first is a 
contractor-by-year random effect, reflecting unobserved contractor heterogeneity. The second is 
a participant-spell specific iid random error component. Equation (3) underscores the two key 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 It is not yet feasible to track post-assignment earnings for more than eight quarters because many of the Work First 
assignments in our data occurred as recently as 2002 and 2003.  
18 These standard errors do not, however, account for the fact that there are 25,802 unique individuals represented in 
our data and so some participants have repeat spells, which may induce serial correlation in employment outcomes across spells 
for the same individual. We demonstrate below that our results are qualitatively identical when the sample is limited to the first 
spell for each participant (see also Appendix Table 1).    20
conditions that our identification strategy requires for valid inference. First, it must be the case 
that ω  is uncorrelated with   
T
ct P  and   
D
ct P , a condition that is (almost) guaranteed to be satisfied by 
the randomization. The second condition is that contractor-by-year random effects are mean 
independent of contractor placement rates, i.e.,  () ()
TD
ct ct ct ct E PE P νν = . It is therefore not 
problematic for our estimation strategy if contractors have significant effects on participant 
outcomes through mechanisms other than job placements (e.g., other activities and supports) 
provided that these effects are not systematically related to contractor job placement rates. We 
proceed for now under the assumption that this condition is satisfied and examine corroborating 
evidence in Section 4.  
a.  Ordinary least squares estimates 
To facilitate comparisons with earlier empirical work, we begin our analysis with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equation (2). The first two columns of Table 3 
presents OLS estimates of Equation (2) for real earnings and quarters of employment for the first 
four calendar quarters following Work First assignment for all 38,689 spells in our data. As 
shown in column (1), participants who obtained any employment during their Work First spell 
earned $789 more in the calendar quarter following UI placement than did clients who did not 
obtain employment. Interestingly, there is little difference between the post-assignment earnings 
of participants taking direct-hire and temporary help jobs. First quarter earnings are estimated at 
$803 and $731, respectively. These contrasts are significantly different from zero but not 
significantly different from one another at the 5 percent level ( .09 p = ).  
Additional rows of Table 3 repeat the OLS estimates for total UI earnings in the four 
quarters following program entry. Participants who obtained any employment during their Work 
                                                                                                                                                                    
19 It is almost identical because means and dummy variables will differ slightly if there is any sample correlation   21
First assignment earned approximately $2,500 more over the subsequent calendar year than those 
who did not. In all post-assignment quarters, those who obtained direct hire placements earned 
about 15 percent more than those who obtained temporary help placements. Panel B, which 
presents comparable OLS models for quarters of employment following Work First assignment, 
shows that participants who obtained direct-hire or temporary help jobs worked about 0.9 
calendar quarters more over the subsequent year than did participants who did not find work.  
Table 4 extends the UI earnings and employment estimates to two full calendar years 
following Work First assignment.
20 Over this period, participants who obtained temporary help 
and direct-hire placements earned $3,385 and $4,212 more than those who did not find a job and 
worked an additional 1.2 and 1.3 quarters respectively (both significant at  0.01 p = ). 
b.  Instrumental variables estimates 
The preceding OLS estimates are consistent with existing research, most notably with 
Heinrich et al. (2005), who find that Missouri and North Carolina welfare recipients taking 
temporary help jobs earn almost as much over the subsequent two years as those obtaining 
direct-hire employment—and much more than non-job-takers. Like Heinrich et al., our primary 
empirical models for earnings and employment contain relatively rich controls, including prior 
(pre-assignment) earnings and standard demographic variables.
21 Instrumental variables 
estimates for the labor market consequences of Work First placements appear initially to be 
consistent with the OLS models. The 2SLS models in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 confirm an 
economically large and statistically significant earnings gain accruing from Work First job 
                                                                                                                                                                    
between contractor dummies and participant characteristics. However, we have already established that, because of the random 
assignment, this correlation is not significantly different from zero.  
20 To include UI outcomes for eight calendar quarters following assignment, we must drop all Work First spells 
initiated after 2002. This reduces the sample to 27,029 spells.  
21 All of our main models control for demographic and earnings history covariates as well as for time and district 
dummies and their interaction. OLS (but not IV) estimates of wage and employment effects of direct-hire and temporary help   22
placements during the first post-assignment quarter. The estimated gain to a Work First job 
placement, $559 ( 5.8 t = ), is about 25 percent less than the analogous OLS estimate.  
When job placements are disaggregated by employment types, however, discrepancies 
emerge. Temporary help and direct-hire job placements are estimated to raise quarter one 
earnings by $460 and $622 respectively. Both are statistically significant. While available 
precision does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that these point estimates are drawn from 
the same distribution ( 0.49 p = ), it is noteworthy that the IV estimate for the earnings gain from 
temporary help placements is approximately 25 percent smaller than the wage gain for direct-
hire jobs. Comparable 2SLS models for quarters of employment (rather than earnings) confirm 
important differences in the employment consequences of temporary help and direct-hire job 
placements. Placements in direct-hire jobs raise the probability of any employment in the first 
post-assignment quarter by 36 percentage points ( 6.1 t = ). By contrast, placements in temporary 
help jobs raise the probability of first quarter employment by only 12 percentage points. This 
point estimate is not distinguishable from zero ( 1.7 t = ), but it is significantly different from the 
point estimate for direct-hire placements.  
When the wage and employment analysis is extended beyond the first post-assignment 
quarter, a far more substantial disparity is evident. In the first four calendar quarters following 
assignment, Work First clients placed in temporary help jobs earn $2,470 less than those 
receiving a direct-hire placement and $306 less than those receiving no placement at all (though 
this latter contrast is insignificant). Estimates for quarters of employment tell a comparable story. 
Direct-hire placements raise total quarters employed by 0.90 over the subsequent four calendar 
                                                                                                                                                                    
placements are about 20 percent larger when these demographic and earnings history controls are excluded (estimates available 
from the authors).   23
quarters ( 6.5 t = ), while temporary help placements have an economically small and statistically 
insignificant effect on total quarters worked in the first year.  
Examining outcomes over a two-year period following Work First assignment (Table 4) 
adds to the strength of these conclusions. Estimated losses associated with temporary help job 
placements are sizable,   $2,176 in earnings and 0.16 calendar quarters of employment, though 
not statistically significant. By contrast, direct-hire placements raise earnings by $6,407 and total 
quarters of employment by 1.56 over two years. For both estimates, we can easily reject the null 
hypothesis that the effects of direct-hire and temporary help job placements are equal. The clear 
picture that emerges from these 2SLS models is that temporary help placements do not 
improve—and potentially harm—labor market outcomes for the Work First population.
22  
c.  The dynamics of earnings, employment, and Work First recidivism 
To better understand the disparate impacts of temporary help and direct-hire job 
placements, we explore the dynamics underlying these outcomes. We first estimate a set of 2SLS 
models that distinguish between employment and earnings in temporary help versus direct-hire 
jobs. Specifically, we estimate a variant of Equation (2) where the dependent variable is earnings 
or employment in temporary help employment or direct-hire employment. Participants not 
receiving earnings or employment in the relevant sector are coded as zero for these outcome 
measures.
23  
                                                   
22 The standard errors that we estimate above cannot simultaneously account for the clustering of errors among 
participants assigned to a contractor and the clustering of errors across time within the same individual. We evaluate the 
importance of serial correlation by estimating key models using only the first Work First spell per participant. These first-spell 
estimates, shown in Appendix Table 1, are closely comparable to our main models for earnings and employment in Table 3. 
Notably, given the one-third reduction in sample size, the slight reduction in the precision of the estimates indicates that the 
precision of our primary estimates is not substantially affected by serial correlation.  
23 For a small set of cases, the industry code is missing from the UI data (though we do measure total earnings and 
employment). These observations are included in the Table 5 analysis but the outcome measures are coded as zero for both 
direct-hire and temporary help earnings and employment. Consequently, the Table 5 point estimates do not sum precisely to the 
totals in Tables 3 and 4. In the Work First administrative case data used to code job types obtained during the Work First spell, 
job types (temporary help or direct-hire) are identified by employer names in all cases.     24
Table 5 shows that marginal temp workers earn an additional $999 and work an 
additional 0.48 quarters in temporary help jobs in the first calendar year following random 
assignment. (Both are significant.) However, these gains in temporary help earnings and 
employment appear to come at the expense of earnings and employment in direct-hire jobs. We 
estimate that temporary help placements displace $1,486 in direct-hire earnings and 0.48 quarters 
in direct-hire employment in the first year. On net, the first-quarter benefits to temporary help 
placements, clearly apparent in Table 4, wash out entirely over the first year. As shown in the 
bottom panel of Table 5, direct-hire placements continue to have large positive and significant 
impacts on direct-hire earnings and employment in the second post-assignment year, whereas 
temporary help placements have no statistically significant effect on employment and earnings in 
either direct-hire or temporary agency jobs over this horizon. Thus, the positive short-term 
benefits of temporary help placements displayed in Table 3 derive entirely from increased 
employment in the temporary help sector; we find no evidence that temporary agency 
placements help workers transition to direct-hire jobs.   
To further explore the dynamics of job placement and job holding, we also examine how 
job placement type affects Work First program recidivism. Using Work First administrative data, 
we implement a variant of Equation (2) where the dependent variable is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a participant returns to Work First within 360 or 720 days of the commencement 
of the prior spell. As shown in Table 1, 36 percent of the Work First spells result in welfare 
program recidivism in Michigan within one year and 51 percent lead to reentry within two years. 
Table 6 shows that participants who obtain jobs during their Work First spells are substantially 
less likely to recidivate within a year or two. Those taking direct-hire jobs are 12 and 11 
percentage points less likely to recidivate over one and two years, respectively (33 and 22   25
percent less than average). Those taking temporary help jobs are 7 and 5 percentage points (19 
and 10 percent) less likely to recidivate over one and two years. These OLS models are unlikely 
to reveal causal relationships. 
When we estimate the recidivism models using Work First random assignments as 
instruments for job attainment, we find that only direct-hire jobs reduce the probability of 
recidivism. Point estimates for temporary help jobs are positive, indicating a higher probability 
of recidivism, but neither is significant. However, we can readily reject the null hypothesis that 
the effects of direct-hire and temporary help job placements on two-year recidivism are 
equivalent. Thus, consistent with the findings pertaining to employment and earnings, only 
direct-hire placements appear to help participants reduce program recidivism, presumably 
because they most likely to lead to stable employment.
24  
4.  Bad jobs or bad contractors? 
A potential objection to the interpretation of our core results is that they may conflate the 
effect of contractor quality with the effect of job type. Imagine, for example, that low quality 
Work First contractors—that is, contractors who generally provide poor services—place a 
disproportionate share of their randomly assigned participants in temporary help jobs, perhaps 
because these jobs are easiest to locate. Also assume for the sake of argument that temporary 
help jobs have the same causal effect on employment and earnings as direct-hire jobs. Under 
these assumptions, our 2SLS estimates will misattribute the effect of receiving a bad contractor 
assignment to the effect of obtaining a temporary help job. Our causal model assumes that 
contractors systematically affect participant outcomes only through job placements, not through 
                                                   
24 A key question that our data do not yet allow us to answer is whether Work First job placements fostered by random 
assignments reduce state welfare payments. In future work, we will obtain linked welfare payment data from the state of 
Michigan to analyze the fiscal impacts of Work First job placements.   26
other quality differentials. The above scenario violates this assumption since it implies that 
() 0
T
ct ct EP ν <  or  () 0
D
ct ct EP ν >  (or both).  
We view the “bad contractor” scenario as improbable. Based on a survey of Work First 
contractors serving this metropolitan area (Autor and Houseman 2005), we document that 
program funding is tight and few resources are spent on anything but job development. A 
standardized program of general or life skills training is provided in the first week of the program 
at all contractors. After the first week, all contractors focus on job placement. Support services 
intended to aid job retention, such as childcare and transportation, are equally available to 
participants from all contractors and are provided outside the program. It also bears emphasis 
that direct-hire and temporary agency job placement rates are positively and significantly 
correlated across contractors, implying that contractors with high job placement rates tend to be 
strong on both placement margins; this fact reduces the plausibility of a scenario in which “bad” 
contractors primarily place participants in temp agency jobs and “good” contractors primarily 
place participants in direct-hire jobs.
25 Nevertheless, we believe the bad contractor concern 
deserves close scrutiny and so provide two formal checks on it below.  
a.  Exploiting the 12 experiments to gauge the consistency of the estimates 
A first test is to reestimate our main models separately for each of the 12 randomization 
districts in our sample. If the aggregate results are driven by outlying contractors or aberrant 
randomization districts, these models will reveal this fact. Appendix Table 2a presents OLS and 
2SLS models by district for the two-way contrast between employment and non-employment. As 
is consistent with the pooled, district estimates in Table 3, eight of 12 2SLS point estimates for 
the effect of job placements on earnings are positive and five are statistically significant. Of the   27
three negative point estimates, none is statistically significant (though one is marginally so). 
Similarly, 11 of 12 2SLS estimates for the effects of job placement on quarters of employment 
are positive and eight are statistically significant. 
In Appendix Table 2b, we provide estimates for the contrast between direct-hire 
employment, temporary help employment and non-employment. These estimates use the sub-
sample of districts (7 of 12) where participants were randomly assigned among three contractors 
during at least some part of the three-year sample window. The results, summarized in Figure 1, 
provide consistent support for the main inferences. In five of seven randomization districts, the 
point estimate for the effect of temporary help placements on four-quarter earnings is 
substantially less positive (or more negative) than for direct-hire placements (by at least $2,000), 
and three of these five contrasts are significant.
26 Similarly, the estimated effect of direct-hire 
placements on four-quarter employment exceeds that of temporary help placements in six of 
seven districts, and three of these contrasts are statistically significant. These disaggregated 
estimates confirm that our core findings reflect a robust and pervasive feature of the data.  
b.  A test of contractor heterogeneity 
As noted above, a survey of contractors failed to uncover systematic differences in 
contractor practices aside from differences in their job placement rates. Here, we provide a 
formal test of the existence of other differences in contractor practices that affect participant 
outcomes. Referring to equation (3), the reduced form version of our main estimating equation, 
the presence of sizable contractor heterogeneity in earnings or employment outcomes (large 
2
ν σ ) 
indicates that contractors have substantial impacts on Work First participants that are 
                                                                                                                                                                    
25 The correlation between contractor-by-year temporary help and direct-hire placement rates is 0.241 ( .02 p = ). A 
regression of direct-hire placement rates on temporary help placement rates, year dummies, and a constant yields a coefficient on 
the temporary help placement rate variable of 0.389 ( .01 p = ). 
26 One countervailing contrast is also significant at  .05 p = .   28
independent of their placement practices. While not intrinsically a problem for our identification 
strategy, this finding would suggest that our statistical model, focused on job placements, 
provides a limited empirical characterization of how contractors affect participant outcomes. 
Moreover, if these other contractor effects were correlated with placement practices, this would 
cause us to (at least partly) misattribute the consequences of other contractor practices to job 
placement practices. By contrast, a small (or insignificant) value of 
2
ν σ  indicates that placement 
rates for a temporary help, direct-hire, or no job capture the entire effect that contractors have on 
participant outcomes. 
We test the magnitude of 
2
ν σ  by first estimating equation (3) by OLS and retaining the 
residuals. We next re-estimate Equation (3), replacing    
T
ct P  and   
D
ct P with a complete set of 
contractor-by-year dummies, also retaining the residuals. We then test for the significance of 
2
ν σ  
by using a conventional F-test to evaluate whether the unrestricted model, containing the 59 
contractor-by-year dummy variables, has significantly more explanatory power for participant 
outcomes than the restricted model in which these dummies are parameterized using only two 
measures,    
T




These F-tests yield a surprisingly strong result. For both participant outcomes (four-
quarter earnings and four-quarter employment), we accept at the 16 percent level or better the 
null hypothesis that the 59 contractor-by-year dummy variables have no additional explanatory 
power for participant outcomes beyond simple mean contractor-by-year job placement rates,   
T
ct P  
and   
D
ct P . We therefore can reject the possibility that there is any significant, non-placement-
                                                   
27 There are 100 contractor-by-year cells and 40 district-by-year dummy variables plus an intercept. This leaves 59 
contractor-by-year dummies as instruments. The F-test of these restrictions is distributed F(J-M, N-J), where N is the total count 
of observations, J is the number of parameters in the unrestricted model, and J-M is the number of parameters in the restricted 
model.   29
related effect of contractors on participant outcomes.
28 This finding demonstrates that we are not 
misattributing the effects of other contractor policies to contractor job placement rates unless 
these other contractor policies are virtually collinear with job placement rates – a possibility that 
we view as highly unlikely.  
5.  Interpreting the parameter estimates  
 
a.  Instrumental variables fixed-effects estimates  
One complication for the interpretation of our estimates is that contractors may exercise 
discretion about which of their randomly assigned participants to encourage toward temporary 
help and direct-hire jobs. For example, some contractors may encourage the most “work-ready” 
participants to obtain temporary help jobs and others the least work-ready. If contractors follow 
substantially different practices regarding the types of individuals they refer to temporary help 
and direct-hire jobs and if treatment effects are strongly heterogeneous within the Work First 
population (i.e., a particular job type has quite different effects on different individuals), our 
estimates, while still unbiased, will identify an unknown interaction of job placements and 
unobserved worker quality.
29 
To address this concern, we ideally would repeatedly randomize job placements for the 
same Work First participants to form within-person, cross job-type (temporary help, direct-hire, 
none) contrasts in employment outcomes. Fortuitously, an exercise akin to this is feasible in our 
sample. Using the panel structure of the research database, we can estimate fixed-effects versions 
of our main 2SLS models using the sub-sample of participants who experience multiple Work 
First spells during the sample window and who are assigned to multiple contractors (because of 
                                                   
28 By contrast, when placement rates are parameterized using a single placement measure that does not distinguish 
between temporary help and direct-hire jobs (
ct ct ct ETD =+), the F-test rejects the null at the 7 percent level for both outcome 
measures.   30
the repeated randomization). Because of the inclusion of individual fixed effects, these models 
identify the coefficients of interest using only within-person, over-time variation in outcomes for 
participants randomly assigned to contractors with differing placement practices.
30  
Fixed effects estimates of the causal effects of job placements on employment and 
earnings, shown in Table 7, are remarkably similar to 2SLS estimates that do not include fixed 
effects. In fact, the most notable difference is that inclusion of fixed effects enhances the 
precision of the estimates. Consistent with our main estimates in Tables 3 and 4, pooled and 
fixed-effects 2SLS models estimated on the multiple-spell sample indicate that direct-hire 
placements raise four-quarter earnings and employment substantially—by $2,301 and 0.75 
quarters respectively in the fixed-effects 2SLS models—while temporary help placements have 
consistently negative (though typically insignificant) impacts on both outcomes.
31 The close 
comparability of the pooled and fixed-effects 2SLS estimates indicates that our main estimates 
accurately portray the person-level effects of job placements on post-assignment earnings and 
employment. 
For comparison with prior fixed-effects estimates of the effect of temporary help jobs on 
the earnings of low-skilled workers (e.g., Segal and Sullivan 1997, 1998; Ferber and Waldfogel 
1998; Corcoran and Chen 2004), we also present in Table 7 a set of OLS (i.e., non-instrumental 
variables) models estimated both including and excluding fixed effects. Inclusion of individual 
fixed-effects in the OLS models reduces the estimated earnings and employment consequences 
                                                                                                                                                                    
29 The estimates will identify a stable “intention to treat”relationship if treatment effects are homogenous or if random 
assignments uniformly raise or lower the probability that each participant obtains a given job placement (temporary help, direct-
hire, non-employment). 
30 The primary sample has 38,689 spells experienced by 25,802 participants. The sample of participants with multiple 
spells includes 8,418 participants and 21,305 spells. In this multiple-spell sample, 6,053 participants (16,024 spells) are randomly 
assigned to two or more distinct contractors. An unattractive feature of the fixed-effects approach is that we are forced to limit the 
sample to participants who experience multiple Work First spells during the sample window, which is a form of selection on the 
outcome variable. For this reason, we do not use fixed-effects models for our primary estimates. 
31 In this case, the estimated four-quarter earnings loss of $1,265 for a temporary help placement is statistically 
significant.   31
of direct-hire and temporary help placements by about half—from approximately $2,000 to 
$1,000 for four-quarter earnings, and from approximately 0.90 to 0.45 quarters for four-quarter 
employment. Yet, even the OLS fixed-effects models show a significant, positive effect of 
temporary help jobs on post-assignment earnings and employment, indicating that fixed-effect 
models are inadequate for obtaining unbiased estimates of the consequences of job placements 
on labor market outcomes.  
b.  Who is the marginal worker?  
The preceding analysis establishes that our estimates capture the effects of job 
placements on individual worker outcomes. In this final section, we explore the characteristics of 
the “marginal” temporary agency and direct-hire workers for whom these outcomes are 
estimated. While it is not possible to individually identify the participants whose employment 
outcomes are directly altered by the quasi-experiment—since we cannot know who would have 
had a different job outcome if assigned to a different contractor—it is feasible to characterize key 
attributes of the affected population. 
Consider the following regression model:  
(4)  12 1[ 1] ( ) i i icdt i i d t d t icdt DT X T D α κκ γ θ γ θ ς += =+ + +++ × + i . 
Here,  X  is a predetermined participant characteristic of interest (e.g., pre-assignment 
earnings or employment), 1[ ] i  is the indicator function, and D and T  are dummy variables 
indicating whether participant i  obtained a direct-hire job or a temporary help job during her 
Work First spell. As before, subscripts c , d , and t  denote contractors, randomization districts, 
and calendar quarters. By construction, the dependent variable is equal to  i X  if participant i  
obtained employment during the Work First spell and zero otherwise.   32
If Equation (4) is fit using OLS, the parameters   
12 and  κ κ  estimate the (conditional) mean 
values of demographic variable  X  for Work First participants who obtained temporary help and 
direct-hire jobs respectively during their Work First spells. For example, OLS estimates of 
Equation (4) in column (1) of Table 8 show that participants who found any employment during 
their Work First spell earned an average of $4,685 and worked 2.15 quarters in the four calendar 
quarters prior to random assignment. Column (2) shows that the prior earnings and labor force 
participation of participants who took temporary help and direct-hire jobs during their Work First 
spells are quite comparable to one another (see also Table 1). The one notable difference 
between the two groups is that participants who took temporary help jobs during their Work First 
spells had significantly higher earnings and employment in the temporary help sector over the 
previous four quarters than those who took direct-hire placements (and lower direct-hire earnings 
and employment by approximately offsetting amounts). 
Now consider 2SLS estimates of equation (4) where the variables T  and D are 
instrumented by contractor and year-of-assignment dummies. In this case,   
12  and  κκ  estimate the 
average characteristics ( ' X s) of “marginal workers,” that is, participants whose employment 
status is changed by the random assignment (Abadie 2003). To see this, consider a simplified 
case with only employment outcome, {0,1} J ∈ , and a single instrumental variable,  {0,1} Z ∈ , that 
affects the odds that a randomly assigned participant obtains employment during her spell. 
Assume that the standard Local Average Treatment Effect assumptions are satisfied (Imbens and 
Angrist 1994), and in particular that random assignment to treatment ( 1 Z = ) weakly increases 
the odds that each participant obtains employment during her Work First spell. In this case, a 
Wald estimate of Equation (4) yields the following quantity:  
(5)    [ | 1, 1] [ | 1] [ | 1, 0] [ | 0]
[| 1 ] [| 0 ]
wald
EX J Z EJ Z EX J Z EJ Z
EJ Z EJ Z
κ
== = − == =
=
=− =
ii .   33
The numerator of this expression is a scaled contrast between the average  X  of employed 
participants in the treatment and control groups. The denominator rescales this contrast by the 
effect of the random assignment on employment odds. The ratio of these two expressions 
provides an estimate of the average  X  of marginal workers—workers whose employment status 
was changed by the random assignment.
32  
Two-stage least squares estimates of Equation (4), found in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
8, establish two key results. First, the earnings histories of “marginal workers” are significantly 
weaker than those of average workers. Specifically, prior-year earnings of marginal workers are 
about $500 below those of average workers while prior-year labor force participation is lower by 
between 0.05 and 0.15 quarters. Hausman tests for the equality of OLS and 2SLS coefficients 
(bottom row of each panel) confirm that these differences in earnings histories are statistically 
significant. It thus appears that random assignments alter employment outcomes among Work 
First participants by moving those with relatively weak earnings histories into or out of the labor 
force, which appears eminently sensible. 
The second result established in Table 8 is that there are no significant differences 
between the pre-placement work histories of marginal temporary workers and marginal direct 
hires. Both groups have weaker prior earnings and employment histories than “average” workers, 
but they do not differ significantly from one another.
33 (Although, notably, prior earnings and 
employment in the temporary help sector are higher among marginal temporary help workers 
                                                   
32 A simple numerical example illustrates. Let  X  be a dummy variable equal to one if a participant is a high-school 
dropout and zero otherwise. Assume that 20 percent of treated participants and 10 percent of control participants find jobs during 
their Work First spells. Also assume that 70 percent of treated participants who find jobs are high school dropouts versus 50 
percent of untreated participants. If one uses Equation (4), these numbers imply that 90 percent of marginally employed are high 
school dropouts. The intuition for this result is that the marginal 10 percent of employed participants must be composed of 90 
percent high school dropouts to raise the average high school dropout share among employed from 50 to 70 percent among the 
treated group.  
33 Estimates akin to those in Table 8 for the demographic characteristics of marginal versus average workers (available 
from the authors), indicate that “marginal temps” are slightly more likely than average temporary workers or marginal direct-  34
than among marginal direct-hire workers, and this contrast approaches statistical significance.) 
The near comparability of the marginal temporary help and direct-hire populations is important 
for the interpretation of our main findings because it indicates that the employment effects of 
direct-hire and temporary help jobs measured above are estimated on similar populations. We 
therefore conclude that “marginal temporary help workers” in our sample would likely have 
fared significantly better had they instead been randomized into direct-hire jobs, and vice versa 
for “marginal direct hires.”
34  
6.  Conclusion 
The primary finding of our analysis is that direct-hire placements induced by the random 
assignment of low-skilled workers to Work First contractors significantly increase payroll 
earnings and quarters of employment for marginal participants—by several thousand dollars over 
the subsequent two years. This effect of direct-hire placements on post-assignment earnings and 
employment is significant, consistent across randomization districts, and economically large. By 
contrast, we find that although temporary help placements increase participants’ earnings over 
the near term, these placements do not raise—and may quite possibly lower—payroll earnings 
and quarters of employment of Work First clients over the one-to-two years following 
placement. These adverse findings for payroll earnings are robust across many permutations of 
sampled districts and post-assignment time intervals in our data. They are corroborated by 
evidence from Work First administrative records that marginal temporary help placements, 
unlike marginal direct-hire placements, do not lower and possibly raise Work First recidivism. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
hires to be female or non-white. These contrasts are statistically significant but economically small – no larger than 5 percentage 
points.  
34 If instead the two marginal populations were disjointed, the direct-hire and temporary help estimates would still 
reflect causal estimates but they would not necessarily inform the question of how “marginal temps” would have fared if 
randomized into direct-hire jobs, and vice versa.    35
Why do temporary help placements appear to provide (at best) no long-term benefits to 
Work First participants? Our leading hypothesis is that temporary help assignments displace 
other productive job-search and employment opportunities. Because the short-term earnings 
gains from temporary help jobs are offset over time by forgone earnings in direct-hire 
employment, it appears that temporary help placements primarily serve to displace future direct-
hire employment rather than to help workers transition to direct-hire jobs. Moreover, although 
never statistically significant, 2SLS coefficient estimates of the effects of temporary help 
placements on earnings over the subsequent one to two year period are always negative—and 
estimated effects on Work-First recidivism always positive—suggesting that in some cases 
participants may be better off passing up temporary help positions and continuing to search for 
better, possibly direct-hire, jobs. 
We emphasize that our results pertain to the ‘marginal’ temporary help job placements 
induced by the randomization of Work First clients across contractors. Our analysis does not 
preclude the possibility that infra-marginal temporary help placements generate significant 
benefits. Nevertheless, our findings are particularly germane for the design of welfare programs. 
The operative question for program design is whether job programs assisting welfare and other 
low-wage workers can improve participants’ labor market outcomes by placing more clients in 
temporary agency positions. Our analysis suggests not. While several researchers have advocated 
greater use of temporary help agencies in job placement programs to help welfare and low-wage 
workers transition to employment (Lane et al. 2003; Holzer 2004; Andersson et al. 2005), we 
conclude that such a policy prescription is premature.  
Finally, our research speaks to the growing European literature that finds that temporary 
help and other non-standard work arrangements serve as effective “stepping stones” into the   36
labor market. Although we do not presume that results for low-skilled U.S. workers apply 
generally to these disparate labor markets and worker populations, it is notable that comparable 
non-experimental methodologies applied to the same empirical question in the United States and 
Europe produce comparable findings—namely, that temporary help jobs foster positive labor 
market outcomes. Notably, we also obtain results comparable to these prior studies when we 
apply conventional OLS and fixed-effects models to our data. Our quasi-experimental evidence 
suggests that these non-experimental methods may be inadequate to resolve the endemic self-
selection of workers into job types according to unmeasured skills and motivation. We conclude 
that the emerging consensus of the U.S. and European literatures that temporary help jobs foster 
labor market advancement—based wholly on non-experimental evaluation—should be 
reconsidered in light of the evidence from random assignments.  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Primary Sample of Work First Participants Randomly 
Assigned to Contractors 1999–2000: Overall and by Job Placement Outcome 
  Job Placement Outcome During Work First Spell 
  All  No Employment  Direct Hire    Temporary Help 
  Mean  Std. error  Mean Std. error  Mean Std. error    Mean  Std. error 
Percent of sample  100.0    52.8  37.6    9.6   
  A. Demographics 
Age 29.6  (0.41) 29.3 (0.06) 29.8 (0.06) 30.3  (0.13)
Female (%)  94.3  (0.12) 94.6 (0.16) 93.9 (0.20) 94.0  (0.39)
Black (%)  97.3  (0.08) 97.2 (0.12) 97.1 (0.14) 98.2  (0.22)
White/Other (%)  2.7  (0.08) 2.8 (0.12) 2.9 (0.14)  1.8  (0.22)
< High school (%)  36.8  (0.25) 39.4 (0.34) 33.6 (0.39) 35.1  (0.78)
High school (%)  35.3  (0.24) 33.5 (0.33) 37.3 (0.40)  37.6  (0.80)
> High school (%)  7.6  (0.13) 7.0 (0.18) 8.5 (0.23)  7.8  (0.44)
Unknown (%)  20.2  (0.20) 20.1 (0.28) 20.6 (0.34)  19.5  (0.65)
                
  B. Work History in Four Quarters Prior to Contractor Assignment 
Wage  earnings  4,210 (31) 3,781 (41) 4,682 (52)  4,723  (100)
Qtrs employed  1.98  (0.01) 1.84 (0.01) 2.14 (0.01)  2.18  (0.02)
Direct  hire  earnings  3,520 (30) 3,170 (39) 3,996 (50)  3,578 (94)
Qtrs direct hire employment  1.51  (0.01) 1.39 (0.01) 1.68 (0.01)  1.48  (0.02)
Temp help earnings  515  (10) 457  (12) 487  (15)  940  (42)
Qtrs temp employment  0.37  (0.00) 0.35 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01)  0.57  (0.02)
                
  C. Job Placement Outcomes during Work First Assignment (if employed) 
Hourly wage  7.53  (0.01) n/a    7.45 (0.02)  7.84  (0.03)
Weekly hours  34.2  (0.05) n/a    33.5 (0.06)  36.7  (0.10)
Weekly earnings  260  (0.70) n/a    253 (0.80)  287  (1.38)
                
  D. Labor Market Outcomes in Four Quarters Following Contractor Assignment 
Wage  earnings  4,203 (30) 2,860 (35) 5,759 (53)  5,497  (104)
Qtrs employed  1.96  (0.01) 1.50 (0.01) 2.47 (0.01)  2.48  (0.02)
Direct  hire  earnings  3,425 (28) 2,313 (33) 5,019 (51)  3,303 (89)
Qtrs direct hire employment  1.48  (0.01) 1.09 (0.01) 2.05 (0.01)  1.34  (0.02)
Temp help earnings  550  (11) 371  (11) 450  (16)  1,935  (63)
Qtrs temp employment  0.34  (0.00) 0.28 (0.00) 0.26 (0.01)  0.99  (0.02)
Work First reentry:                  
     360 days (%)  36.1  (0.24) 41.5 (0.34) 29.2 (0.38) 33.9  (0.78)
     720 days (%)  51.4  (0.25) 56.0 (0.35) 45.3 (0.41) 50.2  (0.82)
                
N 38,689  20,437  14,544    3,708 
Sample: All Work First spells initiated from the fourth quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2003 in 12 Work 
First randomization districts in a metropolitan area in Michigan. Individuals may have multiple spells in our data. 
Data source is administrative records data from Work First programs linked to quarterly earnings from Michigan 
unemployment insurance wage records. Temporary help versus direct hire employers are identified using 
unemployment insurance records industry codes. Recidvism measure identifies individuals who reentered the Work 
First program anywhere in the state of Michigan. All earnings inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI-U). 
   42
Table 2.  P-Values of Chi-Square Tests of Random Assignment of Participant Demographic 
Characteristics across Work First Contractors with Randomization Districts, 1999–
2000 
   Randomization District 
    I  II III IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX  X XI  XII All 
                    
1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 0                 
 P
2  5.0 35.1 9.2 13.2 14.5 5.9 6.6 7.6 9.2 9.0 115.2
 DF  10 20 10 10  10 10  10 10 10 10 110
 P-value  0.89 0.02 0.52 0.21  0.15 0.82  0.76 0.67 0.51 0.53 0.35
 N  1,952 755 721 1,425 n/a 963 822 n/a 748 844 713 720 9,663
2000–2001                   
 P
2  19.9 25.7 29.4 10.3 27.0 22.4 14.6 8.2 8.5 21.1 187.1
 DF  20 20 20 10 20 20 9 10 10 20 159
 P-value  0.47 0.17 0.08 0.41 0.14 0.32 0.10 0.61 0.58 0.39 0.06
 N  1,554 1,474 505 1,405 n/a 974 692 n/a 160 900 558 1,590 9,812
2 0 0 1 – 2 0 0 2                    
 P
2  19.7 22.9 23.6 10.0 20.5 6.6 9.2 11.4 7.4 11.8 16.5 159.8
 DF  20 20 20 10 20 10 10 10  10 10 20 160
 P-value  0.48 0.29 0.26 0.44 0.43 0.76 0.51 0.33  0.68 0.30 0.68 0.49
 N  2,093 1,651 1,051 1,436 994 970 939 1,166 n/a 822 453 1,693 13,268
2002–2003                     
 P
2  22.0 11.3 8.8 8.7 9.7 21.6 14.6 10.5 11.5 20.7 139.6
 DF  20 20 10 10 20 20 18 10 10  20 158
 P-value  0.34 0.94 0.55 0.56 0.97 0.36 0.69 0.39 0.32  0.41 0.85
 N  775 649 337 724 673 437 513 394 n/a 431 n/a 1,013 5,946
A l l   Y e a r s                 
 P
2  66.6 95.0 71.0 42.2 30.2 69.6 52.1 22.0 21.3 34.7 29.5 67.3 601.6
 DF  70 80 60 40 40 60 58 20 19 40 30 70 587
 P-value  0.59 0.12 0.16 0.37 0.87 0.19 0.69 0.34 0.32 0.71 0.49 0.57 0.33
 N  6,374 4,529 2,614 4,990 1,667 3,344 2,966 1,560 908 2,997 1,724 5,016 38,689
Each cell provides the chi-squared value, degrees of freedom, p-value and number of observations for the null 
hypothesis that the 10 main sample covariates are balanced across clients assigned to Work First contractors within 
the relevant randomization district H year cell. Covariates tested are gender, white race, other race, age, primary 
school education, post-primary high school dropout education, total quarters employed and total employment 
earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment, total quarters employed in temporary help agency work 
and total temporary help agency earnings in eight quarters prior to Work First assignment. Far column and bottom 
row provide analogous test statistics pooling across districts either within a year or across years within a district. 
Bottom right-hand cell provides the chi-square test for all districts and years simultaneously. Cells marked “n/a” 
indicate that there was only one contractor operating in the district during most or all of the indicated year. 
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Table 3.  The Effect of Work First Job Placements on Subsequent Earnings and Quarters of 
Employment One to Four Quarters Following Work First Assignment: Participants 
Assigned 1999–2003 
  A. Earnings  B. Quarters Employed 
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
  First Quarter 
Any  job  789  569   0.36  0.28  
  (16)   (100)   (0.01)  (0.04)  
Temp agency job  731    460    0.38    0.12 
   (38)    (206)    (0.01)    (0.07) 
Direct-hire  job   803  622   0.35  0.36 
   (18)    (127)    (0.01)    (0.06) 
R
2 0.19  0.19      0.20  0.20     
H0: Temp = Direct  0.09    0.53    0.03    0.02 
           
  Quarters 2–4 
Any  job  1,686   783   0.53  0.35  
  (53)   (266)   (0.02)  (0.08)  
Temp agency job  1,493    −765   0.49    −0.04 
   (108)  (647)   (0.03)  (0.15) 
Direct-hire  job   1,735  1,542    0.54    0.54 
   (56)    (352)    (0.02)    (0.08) 
R
2 0.20  0.20      0.16  0.16     
H0: Temp = Direct  0.04    0.01    0.10    0.00 
             
  Quarters 1–4 
Any  job  2,475  1,352   0.88    0.63   
  (64)   (349)   (0.02)  (0.11)  
Temp agency job  2,224    −306   0.87    0.08 
   (134)  (816)   (0.03)  (0.20) 
Direct-hire  job   2,537  2,164    0.89    0.90 
   (68)    (456)    (0.02)    (0.13) 
R
2 0.22  0.22      0.21  0.21     
H0: Temp = Direct    0.03    0.02    0.60    0.00 
N = 38,689. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year.  All 
models include year H quarter of assignment and randomization district H year of assignment dummy variables, and 
controls for age and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to 
Work First assignment, and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high 
school, and education unknown). Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U).
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Table 4.  The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Subsequent Earnings and Quarters of 
Employment One to Four Quarters Following Work First Assignment: Participants 
Assigned 1999–2002 
  A. Earnings  B. Quarters Employed 
 OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                
  Quarters 1–4 
Any job  2,360    1,320    0.84    0.54   
 (73)    (532)    (0.03)    (0.13)   
Temp agency job  2,031    −1,059   0.82  0.01 
   (145)    (1,010)    (0.03)    (0.25) 
Direct-hire  job    2,447    3,053   0.84  0.93 
   (77)   (669)    (0.03)    (0.17) 
R
2 0.23  0.23      0.21  0.21     
H0: Temp = Direct  0.01    0.00    0.50    0.01 
                
  Quarters 5–8 
Any job  1,686    1,470    0.44    0.29   
 (73)    (511)    (0.02)    (0.13)   
Temp agency job  1,372    −1,117   0.37   −0.17 
   (140)    (1,179)    (0.03)    (0.23) 
Direct-hire  job    1,765    3,354   0.45  0.62 
   (85)   (835)    (0.02)    (0.19) 
R
2 0.18  0.18      0.14  0.14     
H0: Temp = Direct  0.19    0.01    0.02    0.01 
             
  Quarters 1–8 
Any job  4,046    2,790    1.28    0.83   
 (128)    (986)    (0.04)    (0.23)   
Temp agency job  3,385    −2,176   1.19   −0.16 
   (263)    (2,086)    (0.06)    (0.46) 
Direct-hire  job    4,212    6,407   1.30  1.56 
   (143)    (1412)    (0.04)    (0.33) 
R
2 0.24  0.24      0.21  0.21     
H0: Temp = Direct    0.01    0.00    0.06    0.01 
N = 27,029. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year.  All 
models include year H quarter of assignment and randomization district H year of assignment dummy variables, and 
controls for age and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to 
Work First assignment, and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high 
school, and education unknown). Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U).
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Table 5.  Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Work First Job Placements on 
Earnings and Employment Distinguishing by Earnings Source: Temporary Help vs. 
Direct-Hire Employer 
  A. Earnings    B. Quarters Employed 
 
Temporary 
Help   
Direct 
Hire   
Temporary 
Help   
Direct 
Hire 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                      
  Quarters 1–4: Participants assigned 1999–2003 
Any  job  542    841    0.13    0.51  
 (218)      (242)      (0.07)     (0.09)  
Temp agency job    999      −1,486    0.48     −0.48 
   (467)    (526)    (0.16)    (0.13)
Direct-hire job    319      1,981      −0.04     0.99 
   (223)    (379)    (0.08)    (0.10)
H0: Temp = Direct  0.19      0.00      0.01      0.00 
N 38,689 
             
  Quarters 1–4: Participants assigned 1999–2002 
Any  job  549    686    0.16    0.36  
 (319)      (353)      (0.10)     (0.12)  
Temp agency job    812      −2,158    0.39     −0.54 
   (607)    (582)    (0.21)    (0.15)
Direct-hire job    357      2,757      −0.01     1.01 
   (343)    (488)    (0.13)    (0.13)
H0: Temp = Direct    0.53      0.00      0.17      0.00 
N 27,029 
                      
  Quarters 5–8: Participants assigned 1999–2002 
Any job  −99     1,680      −0.10    0.42   
 (162)      (512)      (0.06)     (0.11)  
Temp agency job    79      −1,234    −0.02    −0.23 
   (279)    (1002)    (0.12)    (0.18)
Direct-hire job    −228    3,803    −0.16     0.90 
   (216)    (835)    (0.09)    (0.18)
H0: Temp = Direct    0.41      0.00      0.39      0.00 
N 27,029 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year.  All models 
include year H quarter of assignment and randomization district H year of assignment dummy variables, and 
controls for age and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to 
Work First assignment, and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than 
high school, and education unknown). Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI-U). 
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Table 6.  The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Work First Program Recidivism 
 OLS  2SLS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
  Return within 360 days of asssignment 
Any job  −0.11  −0.01  
 (0.01)    (0.04)   
Temp agency job    −0.07   0.04 
   (0.01)    (0.08) 
Direct-hire job    −0.12   −0.03 
   (0.01)    (0.05) 
R
2 0.03  0.04     
H0: Temp = Direct    0.00    0.47 
Number of observations  38,689 
        
  Return within 720 days of assignment 
Any job  −0.10  −0.07  
 (0.01)    (0.06)   
Temp agency job    −0.05   0.10 
   (0.01)    (0.08) 
Direct-hire job    −0.11   −0.20 
   (0.01)    (0.08) 
R
2 0.05  0.05     
H0: Temp = Direct    0.00    0.01 
N 27,029 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year.  All models include 
year H quarter of assignment and randomization district H year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age 
and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to Work First 
assignment and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and 
education unknown). 
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Table 7.  Comparison of OLS, Fixed-Effects and Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect 
of Work First Job Placement Models on Earnings and Employment in First Year 
Following Work First Assignment 
 OLS  2SLS 
 Pooled  Fixed-Effects  Pooled Fixed-Effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                
  A. Earnings: Quarters 1–4 
Any job  2,249    1,239    922    848   
 (88)    (81)    (421)    (398)   
Temp agency job    2,048    968    −367  −1,265 
   (160)    (126)    (567)    (515) 
Direct-hire job    2,305    1,319    1,794    2,301 
   (93)    (84)    (552)    (483) 
R
2 0.07  0.07  0.73  0.73         
H0: Temp = Direct    0.12    0.01    0.01    0.00 
                
  B. Quarters Employed: Quarters 1–4 
Any job  0.95    0.48    0.38    0.41   
 (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.13)   (0.12)   
Temp agency job    0.92    0.43    0.02    −0.10 
   (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.18)    (0.15) 
Direct-hire job    0.96    0.50    0.62    0.75 
   (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.16)    (0.15) 
R
2 0.12  0.12  0.71  0.71         
H0: Temp = Direct    0.33    0.10   0.02   0.00 
N  16,024 spells (6,053 participants) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year. All 
models include individual participant fixed effects, year H quarter of assignment and randomization-
district H year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age and its square. Earnings values 
inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
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Table 8.  Models for the Average and Marginal Characteristics of Participants Obtaining 
Temporary Help and Direct-Hire Jobs during their Work First Spells 
  A. Earnings History  B. Employment History 
 OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Earnings in Prior Year  Quarters Worked in Prior Year 
Any  job  4,685    4,078    2.15  1.99  
  (85)   (416)   (0.02)  (0.07)  
Temp  agency  job   4,712    4,284   2.18  2.14 
   (134)  (614)   (0.03)  (0.12) 
Direct-hire  job   4,678    3,978   2.14  1.91 
    (88)   (548)   (0.02)  (0.10) 
R
2  0.24  0.24     0.52  0.52    
H0: Temp = Direct    0.79    0.71    0.27    0.17 
H0: BOLS = B2SLS    0.03  0.10     0.02  0.03 
           
  Temporary Help Earnings in Prior Year    Temporary Help Quarters in Prior Year 
Any  job  583  396   0.39  0.30  
  (17)    (86)    (0.01)  (0.03)  
Temp  agency  job   943  622   0.57  0.38 
    (44)   (178)   (0.02)  (0.08) 
Direct-hire  job   492  286   0.34  0.26 
    (17)   (116)   (0.01)  (0.05) 
R
2  0.05  0.05     0.11  0.12    
H0: Temp = Direct    0.00    0.16    0.00    0.31 
H0: BOLS = B2SLS    0.04  0.02     0.01  0.00 
N=38,689. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year.  All 
models include year H quarter of assignment and randomization district H year of assignment dummy variables. 
Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
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Appendix Table 1.  The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Wage and Salary Earnings 
during First Four Quarters Following Work First Assignment: Sample 
Limited to First Work-First Spell for Each Participant 
  A. Earnings    B. Quarters Employed 
 OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
              
Any  job  2,580    1,327     0.86  0.62  
  (80)   (370)      (0.03)  (0.11)  
              
Temp agency job    2,327    −906     0.84    −0.17 
   (165)   (1,022)    (0.37)  (0.24) 
              
Direct-hire job    2,642    2,417      0.86    1.00 
   (86)   (592)      (0.03)    (0.17) 
              
R
2 0.22  0.22        0.21  0.21     
H0: Temp = Direct  0.08    0.02      0.56    0.00 
N 25,802 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year.  All models include 
year H quarter of assignment and randomization district H year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age 
and its square, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to Work First assignment, and 
four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and education 
unknown). Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
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Appendix Table 2a.  The Effect of Work First Job Placements on Earnings and Employment 
during Four Quarters Following Random Assignment: Estimates by 
Randomization District 
  A.  Earnings    B.  Quarters Worked  Randomization 
District   OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS 
I   2,523  1,067    0.79  0.28 
   (181)  (658)    (0.07)  (0.13) 
   6,374 
II  2,587  1,024    0.84  0.40 
   (172)  (437)    (0.05)  (0.15) 
   4,529 
III  2,836  -209   1.08  0.81 
   (302)  (959)    (0.12)  (0.32) 
   2,614 
IV  2,429  1,430   0.83  0.17 
   (214)  (708)    (0.05)  (0.23) 
   4,990 
V  2,371  -65    0.93  1.16 
   (305)  (2,762)    (0.09)  (1.08) 
   1,667 
VI  2,408  957    0.92  0.40 
   (235)  (219)    (0.09)  (0.23) 
   3,344 
VII   2,611  1,885   1.01  1.20 
   (172)  (684)    (0.06)  (0.19) 
   2,966 
VIII   2,574  105    1.00  0.19 
   (199)  (269)    (0.11)  (0.04) 
   1,560 
IX  2,071  -3,440   0.75  -0.69 
   (200)  (1,849)    (0.08)  (0.71) 
   908 
X  2,170  -876   0.81  0.56 
   (170)  (195)   (0.05)  (0.06) 
   2,997 
XI  2,746  344    1.08  0.99 
   (216)  (568)   (0.08)  (0.19) 
   1,724 
XII   2,290  3,673   0.84  1.29 
   (150)  (649)   (0.04)  (0.12) 
   5,016 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment H year.  All models include 
year H quarter of assignment and randomization district H year of assignment dummy variables, and controls for age 
and its square, gender, race, sum of UI earnings and UI quarters worked in four quarters prior to Work First 
assignment, and four education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and 
education unknown). Earnings values inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
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Appendix Table 2b.  The Effect of Work-First Job Placements on Earnings and Employment 
during Four Quarters Following Random Assignment: Estimates by 
Randomization District 
  A. Earnings  B.  Quarters Worked  Randomization 
District   OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
I    
Temp agency job    2,375  -3,062  0.83  -0.14 
   (224)  (3,433)  (0.06)  (0.60) 
Direct-hire job    2,561  5,622  0.77  0.74 
   (193)  (3,768)  (0.07)  (0.60) 
H0: Temp = Direct    0.39  0.25  0.06  0.47 
   N=6,374 
II    
Temp agency job    1,791  -4,323  0.64  -0.50 
   (365)  (1,805)  (0.09)  (0.39) 
Direct-hire job    2,832  5,732  0.90  1.20 
   (155)  (1,633)  (0.05)  (0.33) 
H0: Temp = Direct    0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
   N=4,529 
III    
Temp agency job    2,560  -2,485  1.11  -0.18 
   (474)  (1,604)  (0.15)  (0.71) 
Direct-hire job    2,903  31  1.07  0.92 
   (281)  (1,096)  (0.11)  (0.30) 
H0: Temp = Direct    0.34  0.13  0.61  0.11 
   N=2,614 
V    
Temp agency job    2,423  -21,575  1.11  -5.73 
   (552)  (5,297)  (0.10)  (1.21) 
Direct-hire job    2,360  -5,923  0.89  -0.72 
   (267)  (1,746)  (0.09)  (0.65) 
H0: Temp = Direct    0.87  0.01  0.09  0.00 
   N=1,667 
VI    
Temp agency job    2,506  2,731  0.96  1.09 
   (405)  (0,710)  (0.09)  (0.74) 
Direct-hire job    2,378  -72  0.91  0.00 
   (269)  (0,631)  (0.10)  (0.43) 
H0: Temp = Direct    0.79  0.05  0.56  0.34 
   N=3,344 
VII    
Temp agency job    1,883  4,056  0.97  0.75 
   (282)  (2,408)  (0.11)  (0.73) 
Direct-hire job    2,749  2,012  1.02  1.17 
   (229)  (604)  (0.07)  (0.23) 
H0: Temp = Direct    0.08  0.34  0.66  0.45 
   N=2,966 
XII    
Temp agency job    2,664  1,016  0.85  0.34 
   (476)  (1,850)  (0.09)  (0.38) 
Direct-hire job    2,202  4,953  0.84  1.75 
   (172)  (1483)  (0.04)  (0.35) 
H0: Temp = Direct    0.41  0.16  0.83  0.04 
   N=5,016 
Notes. See Appendix Table 2a.   52
Figure 1.  Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Differential Impact of Direct-Hire vs. 
Temporary Help Job Placements on UI Earnings and Quarters of Employment for 
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